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Abstract 
 
This article examines the circumstances under which CSR initiatives facilitate and/or constrain 
labor agency in GPNs. Using a case study of Nike’s CSR approach in the football manufacturing 
industry of Pakistan, we explore how the CSR measures advocated in a new, emerging policy 
paradigm on CSR in GPNs affect labor agency at Nike’s main football supplier factory in Pakistan.  
We argue that international companies may undermine labor agency in GPNs through their sourcing 
policies, but that their CSR policies could have a potential, albeit limited, positive impact on labor 
agency in GPNs which is significantly shaped by national-level contextual factors. 
 
Keywords: labor agency, global production networks, football manufacturing, Pakistan, corporate 
social responsibility  
JEL classification: F23, J31, J52, J80, L67 
 
2 
 
1   Introduction 
The outsourcing of products and services from developed countries to developing countries and 
economies in transition is one of the dominant features of the current phase of economic 
globalization (Wills 2009). On the one hand, the outsourcing of production and services has created 
millions of job in developing countries and economies in transition, substantially raising the 
incomes of many impoverished workers and their families. On the other hand, outsourcing has also 
been associated with poor working conditions, industrial accidents, and environmental pollution in 
export-oriented industries in developing countries where the enforcement of national labor and 
environmental laws has either been lax or absent (Mayer and Pickles 2011). Since the early 1990s, 
these developments have led to widespread concerns that an international social and environmental 
race-to-the-bottom might be occurring. Critical media reports, NGOs, and trade union activism have 
thus compelled many internationally branded companies to adopt social and environmental 
guidelines – so-called codes of conduct – and require that their suppliers in developing countries 
abide by these guidelines (Seidman 2007). In theory, suppliers that complied with these guidelines 
were to be rewarded with more business while suppliers that did not live up to the requirements 
stipulated in these guidelines were to be excluded from the global production networks (GPNs) of 
leading international brands (Locke et al. 2009).  
 
There is now an increasing awareness that the implementation of such guidelines might have 
positive effects on tangible issues such as the reduction of overtime and the payment of minimum 
wages at supplier factories. However, they do little or nothing to improve the ability of workers to 
freely join trade unions and bargain collectively in order to ensure improvements in their working 
conditions (ETI 2006, Barrientos and Smith 2007). Hence, in recent practitioner-oriented literature, 
there is now talk of moving towards a new approach to working with corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)
1
 in global supply chains that will ensure better social outcomes at the bottom of GPNs in 
developing counties (Posthuma and Nathan 2010). One suggestions, for instance, is that better 
coordination between brands’ purchasing and CSR departments may help to avoid a situation in 
which sourcing personnel demand constant price declines while the CSR staff of the same 
corporation demand that suppliers increase workers’ wages (Oxfam 2010). Capacity building in the 
area of human resource management is also seen as a way of improving the interaction between 
                                                          
1
 CSR is here defined as the integration of economic, social, and environmental concerns into the core business 
practices of companies. 
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management and workers in developing country suppliers (Locke et al 2009). In addition, training 
of workers may heighten their awareness of their rights under national labor laws and the brands’ 
code of conduct. Finally, instead of conducting only one, two, or three-day ‘snapshot’ social audits 
of developing country factories, brands are now being encouraged to work together with local 
NGOs and trade unions to ensure that work conditions at production sites are monitored all year 
round (IDH 2009).  
 
In this article, our main aim is to explore whether this new approach to working with CSR in GPNs 
will enable or constrain workers’ ability to collectively organise and demand improvements in their 
work conditions. In other words, under what circumstances do the CSR initiatives of internationally 
branded companies facilitate or constrain workers’ agency in export-oriented industries in 
developing countries?  The literature on labor agency in GPNs has usually conceived of labor 
agency as workers acting collectively through trade unions with the aim of defending their rights 
and improving their conditions of work (Cumbers et al. 2008, Riisgaard 2009, Riisgaard and 
Hammer 2011, Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011). As Riisgaard and Hammer (2011) point out, however, 
the ability to construct associational power is ultimately driven as much by local and national 
institutional context – often termed the ‘horizontal’ dimension – as it is by GPN structures – the 
‘vertical’ dimension. More recently, labor agency in GPNs has also been understood in terms of 
unorganised workers opting in and out of particular work forms and kinds of employment. In this 
literature, the focus has been on how the decision-making processes of workers in relation to their 
choice of work form/occupation has been facilitated or constrained by their embeddedness in local 
socio-economic contexts (Carswell and De Neve 2013, Lund-Thomsen, 2013). In this article, we 
contribute to this emerging literature on labor agency in GPNs by investigating the circumstances 
under which the CSR policies of internationally branded companies, in this case Nike, may 
facilitate or undermine worker agency at the level of supplier factories. We believe that our article 
is the first to explore how measures advocated in the new approach to working with CSR in GPNs 
described above (policy coordination between sourcing and CSR personnel, improved human 
resource management practices, training of workers, and year-round monitoring of work conditions 
at supplier sites) affect labor agency in GPNs. In line with recent research, however, we find that 
worker agency can only ultimately be understood in relation to the local institutional and regulatory 
context. 
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We use an experiment carried out by Nike in the football manufacturing industry of Pakistan in 
2008/9 as our case study. In this case Nike attempted to coordinate its sourcing and CSR policies, 
improve human resource management practices by providing workers with productivity incentives, 
training workers in their rights under Pakistani labor law and the Nike code of conduct, and 
conducting year-round monitoring of work conditions at its supplier factory in Pakistan. Our main 
line of argument is that Nike’s policy experiment seems to have been undermined by the eruption of 
the global financial crisis in 2008 that made it financially unviable for Nike’s supplier factory to 
fully comply with Nike’s new CSR approach in 2009. At the factory level, worker agency was not 
facilitated by the integration of Nike’s sourcing and CSR policies, its added productivity incentives 
or year-round monitoring of work conditions. However, training factory workers in their rights 
under Pakistani labor law and Nike’s code of conduct appeared to raise their level of awareness to 
such an extent that they organised strikes and were partly successful in having their demands met. 
 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we develop an analytical framework that 
conceptualises the circumstances under which internationally branded companies facilitate and/or 
constrain workers’ agency in export-oriented industries in developing countries through the use of 
the new approach to working with CSR in GPNs. We then briefly introduce the methodology than 
underpins this study. Our empirical analysis is subsequently divided into two sections. We first 
introduce the Sialkot cluster and Nike’s role within it before exploring the impacts of CSR 
imperatives transmitted through the vertical dimension of the production networks on the potential 
for labor agency. Second, we explore the role of local and national Pakistan-based actors – 
constituting the horizontal dimension – arguing that the role of these actors is crucial in shaping 
worker agency and ultimately the effectiveness of Nike’s recent interventions from the worker 
perspective. Finally, the conclusion outlines the main findings and the policy implications of our 
analysis. 
 
2   Analytical framework: conceptualising labor agency in global production networks 
Our analytical framework seeks to explain how a multinational company’s sourcing and CSR 
policies may facilitate and/or constrain labor agency at the level of local supplier factories in 
developing countries. We broadly place ourselves within the GPN approach that conceptualises 
how goods and services are designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, consumed, and recycled 
on a world-wide basis (Coe et al. 2008). The GPN approach is often discussed in relation to two 
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other strands in the literature on GPNs. In the early 1990s, the term global commodity chains 
(GCCs) was coined to understand how global production systems were organized (Gereffi 1994). 
However, as global production was increasingly involving the manufacturing of high-tech products 
and services, the term commodity was replaced with the idea of global value chains (GVCs) since 
value addition at each stage of the production chain was crucial to global economic organization. 
Against the backdrop of the GCC/GVC literatures, the so-called Manchester school of economic 
geographers developed an alternative conception of GPNs. Whereas the GVC literature mainly 
focused on inter-firm relations, the GPN approach emphasized that a broader network of actors 
including nation states, international organizations, trade unions, NGOs, and communities played a 
crucial role in the organization of GPNs. In addition, whereas GVC literature  has tended to look 
mostly at governance dimension of GPNs (i.e. power in inter-firm relationships), a central project of 
the GPN approach has been to incorporate the embeddedness of GPNs in particular local socio-
economic and socio-cultural environments that play key roles in structuring GPNs from the bottom-
up (Henderson et al. 2002, Coe et al. 2008). 
 
In this article, our use of the GPN approach reflects our wish to explore how CSR and labor agency 
are embedded in wider networks of relationships. These include not only global lead firms and 
suppliers in developing countries but also other actors such as international and national regulatory 
authorities, international NGOs, trade unions, and the media. We see these wider networks as 
playing crucial roles in determining what is produced, where, when, in which quantity, and at what 
price in GPNs. In addition, we are concerned with how the relationship between CSR and labor in 
GPNs is embedded in local socio-economic contexts. Hence, both formal (in the form of national 
laws and implementation agencies) and informal institutions (such as values, norms, and beliefs) are 
seen as important in structuring the way in which GPNs are governed. This factor also has to be 
taken into account when analyzing the gains or loses accruing to local firms, contractors, and 
workers from GPN restructuring, including the kind of restructuring that follows from the 
implementation of CSR policies in GPNs.  
 
In our analytical framework we also draw a distinction between vertical and horizontal relations in 
the analysis of GPNs (Neilson and Pritchard 2009, 2010). We follow Riisgaard and Hammer (2011) 
in arguing that labor agency within GPNs can only be understood in terms of the intersection of 
these two dimensions. Through their research on the cut flower and banana sectors, they posit that 
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‘the governance of inter-firm linkages, while crucial in structuring the terrain for labor, is always 
mediated by the specific social relations of local production and labor control regimes as well as the 
histories and orientations of the respective actors’ (p.183). They argue that the potential for worker 
agency is shaped by the intersection of three factors: the overall ‘drivenness’ of the network, 
whether it is a producer or buyer driven system, and the nature of the local labor control regime.  
 
The vertical dimension of GPN analysis thus has to do with the role that internationally branded 
firms play in determining the terms of GPN participation for local firms, contractors, and workers. 
If orders from international buyers are stable, and if buyers supply workers with a range of CSR 
benefits including bonus incentives, overtime payments, and social insurance, workers are in a 
better position to bargain for higher wages and demand more benefits associated with their 
employment in a local supplier factory (Selwyn 2008, Oxfam 2010). However, paradoxically, 
providing workers with a range of CSR benefits might also be part of the strategies used by 
international brands to undermine the potential for labor agency in GPNs and instead create a stable, 
loyal, and productive workforce,. Hence, as Selwyn (2009) demonstrated in his analysis of 
fruiticulture exports in North-East Brazil, many exporting farms introduced a range of real benefits 
(e.g., subsidised housing and welfare benefits) for workers, with the aim of reducing their links to 
the relatively militant rural trade unions in the area. This reflects the concern in the CSR literature 
with securing a business case for CSR through which companies maintain their profitability by 
incorporating social and environmental concerns into their core business operations (Blowfield and 
Frynas 2005).  
 
Hence, if curbing labor agency is an intended outcome of brands and their suppliers introducing 
CSR schemes in GPNs, an unintended consequence of introducing a range of CSR benefits to 
workers at the bottom of GPNs may be to stimulate worker agency in instances where brands and 
suppliers fail to deliver on their CSR promises. For example, if buyers do not provide regular orders 
to their suppliers, this places local producers in a situation where they might not able to run a 
financially profitable operation during those times when their order books are low (Ruwanpura and 
Wrigley 2011). In turn, this might trigger the agency of workers as they realize that they are not 
provided with the promised CSR benefits. 
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GPNs also play an important role in determining the scope for labor agency to the extent that 
international buyers operate with stringent CSR requirements. In instances where these buyers 
demand strict compliance with such requirements, local manufacturers are likely to be under greater 
pressure to listen to the demands of the workers they employ (Riisgaard and Hammer 2011). 
Conversely, if local manufacturers are serving international customers that are not concerned about 
CSR compliance, the scope for workers to have their voices and demands heard is likely to be more 
constrained. In such instances, workers may have little or no influence in terms of co-determining 
the conditions under which they labor. 
 
The horizontal dimension, in turn, refers to the local socio-economic and community contexts in 
which developing country export industries are embedded (Neilson and Pritchard 2010). In a study 
of aquaculture unionism in Chile, for example, Oseland et al. (2012) argue that worker agency in 
GPNs is heavily conditioned by national factors, with three domains being scaled heavily at the 
national level: the organization of labor networks, the regulation of economic and employment 
affairs, and the sphere of public discourse about work and its regulation. Similarly, as authors such 
as Brammer et al (2012) and Gond et al (2011) recognize, CSR is also interpreted and ‘translated’ 
into national contexts where it is embedded in social networks, business associations and political 
structures. It is within these national contexts that the sourcing and CSR policies of internationally 
branded buyers play a crucial role in facilitating or undermining labor agency at the ‘bottom’ of 
GPNs. Accordingly in the horizontal aspect of our analytical framework we identify four factors 
that are likely to mediate how the sourcing and CSR policies of internationally branded companies 
affect the scope for workers’ agency in local supplier factories. These are the use of private sector 
consultants, trade unions, NGOs, and the presence/absence of an independent national media. 
 
First, private sector consultants are often portrayed as requiring high fees for conducting rapid, 
superficial, and non-participatory audits of supplier factories in developing countries (Auret and 
Barrientos 2004). As the consultants tend to be paid by either the international brand or local 
supplier companies, they are seen as primarily being accountable to and serving the interests of 
these firms instead of workers in GPNs. In addition, their reports are rarely published in the public 
realm, which means that it is not possible to independently scrutinize the quality of their work and 
the performance of individual supplier factories (O’Rourke 2006). In other words, the use of private 
sector consultants may be seen as an attempt at substituting traditional forms of industrial relations, 
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with labor rights consultants supposedly ‘voicing the concerns of workers’ instead of workers 
jointly organizing themselves and defending their rights vis-à-vis their employers. On a more 
positive note, other consultants may employ more participatory methods, have greater knowledge of 
the contextual setting and the native languages of workers, and conduct both on-site and off-site 
interviews with workers. These worker interviews may highlight labor rights violations at local 
factories. At least in theory, using more participatory social auditing methods could also help 
workers in articulating their concerns in ways that might help them collective organize and 
influence their employers (Auret and Barrientos 2004). 
 
Second, trade unions have often been highlighted as a key vehicle for strengthening workers agency 
in GPNs. On the one hand, trade unions provide the means through which workers can articulate 
their joint interests and engage in collective bargaining vis-à-vis their employers. The rights to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining are therefore seen as critical in relation to 
improving workers’ scope for influencing their employers. This is also known as ‘associational 
power’ (Wright 2000) which arises from the collective organization of workers in trade unions and 
political parties (Selwyn 2008). On the other hand, levels of unionization are often low in 
developing countries, potentially limiting their effectiveness as fora through which workers can 
jointly organize themselves. Trade unions in developing countries have also been criticized for 
being male-dominated, sometimes corrupt, and representing the interests of their leaders rather than 
the workers in whose name they speak. In these circumstances, their potential as a vehicle for 
articulating workers’ demands may be quite limited. However, low levels of associational power do 
not necessarily translate into low levels of what Wright (2000, p. 962) describes as ‘structural 
power’, i.e. that which arises out of the strategic position of workers in the production system. 
Drawing on the work of Wright, Silver (2003) further subdivides structural power into two sub-
categories: marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power. The former arises in 
demand-supply relations, for example in instances where there might be a shortage of skilled labor 
in particular industries which accordingly increases the bargaining power of workers. Workplace 
bargaining power has to do with the ability of workers to stop production flows which can have 
wider spill-lover effects on employment relations (see also Selwyn 2008). To this, we may add that 
labor agency is likely to be enhanced if workers labor in a central production site where they might 
be in a better position to organise themselves, and undermined if workers are situated in dispersed, 
subcontracted employment units – for example, small-scale workshops or home-based work.  
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Third, NGOs are also an important factor that may facilitate and/or constrain worker agency in 
GPNs. On the one hand, the literature on public-private partnerships has emphasized that NGOs’ 
may help in terms of providing knowledge, resources, and context sensitivity to the work of 
corporations whose operations affect the livelihoods of local communities in developing countries. 
In particular, the ability of NGOs to interact with and organize communities in developing countries 
may provide an opportunity for corporations to improve their relations with local-level stakeholders 
(Rein and Stott 2009). In theory, NGOs might thus open a channel through which workers can 
communicate or articulate their demands in relation to their employers. On the other hand, the 
literature on public-private partnerships also emphasizes the risk of NGOs getting ‘too close for 
comfort’ when interacting with corporations. NGOs may lose their independence and legitimacy by 
working together with corporations as they adopt their values and ways of viewing the world (Baur 
and Schmitz 2012). In this way, NGOs may become an actor that constrains the agency of workers 
in export-oriented industries in developing countries.  
 
The final part of our framework deals with the role that local and international media may play in 
relation to facilitating and/or constraining worker agency in developing country export industries 
(cf. Oseland et al., 2012). On the one hand, if the local media is independent of government control 
in developing countries, news reports may play a key role in highlighting the plight of workers that 
are engaged in struggles with their employers over their work conditions. Bringing such struggles 
into the public realm may raise the stakes for their employers. Not only do they risk losing their 
public legitimacy, but they might also face regulatory action from local authorities and/or losing 
their international customers if they do not heed their workers’ concerns (Tran 2011). On the other 
hand, if the local media is tightly controlled by government authorities, press freedom non-existent, 
and critical journalists persecuted, this is likely to constrain workers’ ability to voice their concerns 
in the public realm. In this way, it may be difficult for workers to form alliances, either domestically 
or internationally, that might help them in bringing pressure on their employers to rectify their 
grievances. Hence, local media may be a critical factor in either facilitating and/or constraining 
worker agency in local supplier firms.  
 
In sum, this paper seeks to make two distinct contributions to the embryonic literature on labor 
agency in GPNs. First, we seek to evaluate the potential of new modes of CSR transmitted through 
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the ‘vertical’ dimension of GPNs to facilitate worker agency in developing country suppliers given 
wider cost and competitive pressures within a context of global economic crisis. Second, while 
granting worker rights may be an element of such CSR initiatives, their ultimate effectiveness is 
shaped by the activities of a variety of local and national actors in the production context. Both 
analytically and empirically, we map out the ‘horizontal’ elements that codetermine the scope for 
worker agency in combination with wider GPN dynamics. 
 
3   A note on methodology 
Our article draws upon a comparative study of the work conditions in the football manufacturing 
industries of Pakistan, India, and China (see Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010; Lund-Thomsen 2013; 
Khara and Lund-Thomsen 2011, Lund-Thomsen et al. 2011). This study concentrated on mapping 
the GPNs linking international football brands, suppliers in the three countries, contractors, and 
football stitchers engaged in factory, stitching centre, and home-based work. A mapping process 
was also undertaking of the work conditions of football stitchers engaged in factory, stitching 
centre, and home-based work across the production locations. 
 
At the time of our fieldwork in late 2009, the Pakistani football manufacturing industry consisted of 
approximately 390 enterprises, many of which were small and medium-sized firms with 250 
employees or less. Only a handful of companies could be considered large with 250 employees or 
more located at the factory site. The process of football stitching was outsourced to approximately 
20,000 football stitchers at the beginning of our fieldwork when the financial crisis had affected the 
cluster the worst. This number increased to approximately 22,000 stitchers at the end of our 
fieldwork in November 2009. Out of these stitchers approximately 400-500 were working in Nike’s 
main supplier factory, Silverstar, while the rest of the stitchers were laboring in village-based 
stitching centres in the supply chains of other international brands. These village-based stitching 
centres had been established to facilitate the process of child labor monitoring within the cluster. 
The centres would usually consist of a centrally located building or demarcated outdoor space 
which could either be rented by a contractor, owned by the factory or individual stitchers. 
 
Interviews were undertaken with the sourcing and CSR personnel of leading international buyers 
from the Sialkot cluster including the international and local representatives of brands such as Nike, 
Adidas, UK-based Mitre, Danish Select Sports, and alternative brands such as Fairdeal Trading. 
11 
 
These interviews focused on the history of the brands’ involvement with the cluster, their 
perception of the competitive strengths and weaknesses of the cluster, their relationship with 
individual suppliers, their CSR requirements, and how they monitored the enforcement of these 
requirements. We then traced their supply chains to Sialkot, interviewing 11 local suppliers, 
including some suppliers in our sample that supplied footballs to non-branded international buyers 
in markets in the developing world. These interviews mostly focused on how their business was 
affected by their buyers’ sourcing and CSR requirements, and how they monitored the 
presence/absence of child labor in their own stitching supply chains. We then took one further step 
down the supply network, interviewing eight contractors about how they carried out their work, 
supplying stitchers with panels and thread to stitch footballs and returning the stitched footballs to 
the factories in the center of Sialkot. Finally, we undertook 51 individual interviews and 11 focus 
group interviews with stitchers engaged in factory, centre, and home-based football stitching. 
Individual interviews focused on football stitchers basic conditions of work including issues such as 
salary payments, work hours, occupational health and safety, work intensity, and levels of social 
protection. Our focus group interviews explored what football stitchers saw as the pros and cons of 
stitching footballs in factories, stitching centres and/or home-based locations.  
 
The evidence presented in this paper draws primarily on interviews with Nike’s CSR staff in the 
United States and via telephone, internal Nike policy documents, the CEO and CSR staff of its main 
supplier factory in Pakistan, Silverstar, the NGO Pakistan Institute of Labor Research and 
Education, Matrix Sourcing (a sourcing company working for Nike in Pakistan), Just Solutions (an 
international labor rights consultancy working for Nike), and  14 interviews as well as two focus 
groups that we carried out with male workers from Nike’s main supplier factory, Silverstar, in 2008 
and 2009. In addition to the issues identified above, the individual interviews with Silverstar 
stitchers also touched upon on workers’ level of awareness of Nike’s CSR requirements, their 
perceptions of the consultants hired for CSR monitoring, their impression of the training sessions 
they attending regarding their rights under Pakistani labor law and Nike’s code of conduct, as well 
as how they collectively organized themselves to have their demands heard from Silverstar’s 
management. 
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4   Nike’s football manufacturing operations in Sialkot: the vertical dimension  
Our article is certainly not the first to focus to focus on labor issues in the Pakistani football 
manufacturing industry. A substantial body of work has investigated the role of industry led 
approaches to eradicating child labor in the Sialkot cluster (Hussein-Khaliq 2004), multi-
stakeholder initiatives aimed at combating child labor (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 2010, 2012), local 
manufacturer perceptions of Western CSR policies (A. Khan 2007, F. Khan 2007, Khan and Lund-
Thomsen 2011), work conditions in Nike’s football supplier factories (Siegman 2008), and the 
decision-making processes of unorganized stitchers in regard to opting in and out of particular work 
forms (Lund-Thomsen 2013). In an earlier article, one of the current authors also argued that Nike’s 
CSR policies systematically excluded female football stitchers from participation in Nike’s GPN. In 
fact, Nike’s CSR approach did not take into account how the local socio-economic context affected 
the participation of females in the football manufacturing workforce. In particular, Nike’s CSR 
policies did not recognize how factors such as geographical distance, local patriarchal values in the 
stitcher community, modes of recruitment, and a diversity of livelihood strategies facilitated and/or 
constrained female stitchers’ possibilities for engaging in factory-based work. In this article, we 
therefore concentrate on investigating how Nike’s CSR policies affect labor agency amongst the 
male football stitchers employed at its main football supplier in Pakistan, Silverstar. Our focus is on 
football stitching as this is the most labor-intensive aspect of the football manufacturing process. 
 
Nike’s involvement in the Sialkot football cluster can be traced back to the mid-1990s where the 
company began sourcing footballs from a supplier known as Saga Sports. The company’s arrival in 
the cluster coincided with the emergence of international media reports that children were involved 
in football stitching in Sialkot’s villages. As a result an international multi-stakeholder initiative, the 
Atlanta Agreement, was formed including internationally branded manufacturers, the International 
Labor Organization, the United Nation Fund for Children (UNICEF), Save the Children, and the 
Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Hussein-Khaliq 2004). The Atlanta Agreement 
introduced a child labor monitoring mechanism in the cluster and several social projects aimed at 
transferring children from football stitching to school. Saga Sports played a key role in designing 
the Atlanta Agreement and initiated the switching of home-based stitching to the designated 
stitching centers described above (A. Khan 2007). However, several years later, in late 2006, Nike 
announced that it would pull-out from Saga Sports due to labor rights violations occurring at the 
Saga Sports factory site and the unauthorized outsourcing of football stitching from centres to 
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home-based locations. In early 2007, Nike re-entered the Sialkot cluster with a new supplier, 
Silverstar, introducing a new production and CSR model in the cluster (Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi 
2010).  
 
Although the new production and CSR model included lean manufacturing principles, Nike’s main 
requirements were that all workers had to be registered full time employees with aligned social 
benefits. Their pay should be based on an hourly wage with related performance bonuses. The new 
model also included worker and management training programs to educate workers on Nike’s code 
of conduct/core labor standards, their legal rights under Pakistani law, and the importance of human 
resource management as the best way to maintain worker management dialogue and 
communication. Compliance with Nike’s production and CSR requirements was to be closely 
monitored by Nike’s agent in Pakistan – a sourcing company called Matrix Sourcing.  CSR audits 
were also to be occasionally carried out by other third-party monitors.  Training of workers was 
undertaken by the Pakistan Institute of Labor Education and Research – a well reputed NGO based 
in Karachi – in cooperation with the UK-based labor rights consultancy company, Just Solutions. In 
this way, Nike’s sourcing and CSR policies in relation to Silverstar sought to facilitate the agency 
of male factory-based workers in this factory.  
 
At the time of our fieldwork in 2009, the male stitchers in Silverstar were all in their 20s or 30s, 
locals from Punjab province, engaged in full-time stitching eight hours a day (9-5), and the main 
bread earners of their families. The monthly salaries levels (PKR 7540: US$263) and the working 
hours (nine hours a day) of the factory-based, Silverstar stitchers included in our sample tended to 
be slightly higher and longer than those of the centre (PKR 5460; US$191) and home-based 
stitchers (US$2275; US$191) we interviewed. All of the stitchers were hired after mid-2007 when 
Silverstar began producing footballs for Nike. The workers had either completed primary or 
secondary education, allowing them to understand Nike’s production and CSR requirements, and 
were capable of keeping up with Nike’s production requirements of having to stitch at least four 
match balls a day. The work was physically demanding, with each ball sometimes requiring more 
than 800 individual stitches. Sometimes the football stitchers would also suffer from work-related 
injuries such as needle pricks, deformed fingers, and backache from long hours of stitching in the 
same position (Lund-Thomsen 2013). However, the value of their earnings (US$263 a month), 
while above the minimum wage and the highest offered in the industry, could hardly cover even the 
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most basic amenities required to sustain a family. For example, an estimate of the NGO, the 
International Labor Rights Forum, indicated that a football stitcher heading a family of five would 
need PKR 12,000 a month to sustain that family if  food, education, electricity/gas, medical, 
housing, and miscellaneous expenditures were to be covered (ILRF 2010). Nevertheless, the 
workers were supposed to be covered by social insurance (old age pension, medical insurance, and 
a one-off compensation in case they were laid-off). 
 
In our analytical framework, we argued that vertical relations within the production network might 
be used as a driver for enhancing worker agency. Importantly, the ability of international brands to 
supply stable order volumes may facilitate the ability of workers to extract higher wages and fringe 
benefits from their employers. Conversely, if international brands could not provide regular orders 
to their supplier in the developing world, this may have constrained their ability to negotiate with 
their employers for improvements in their work conditions. The latter process turned out to be the 
most important in our case study. 
 
At the time of the research in 2009, the global financial crisis had recently erupted and was 
affecting the global football manufacturing industry. In practice, Nike was not able to place the 
order volumes that the factory owner had initially expected (around 300,000 footballs a month). 
Instead production levels were down to 60-70,000 balls in June/July 2009. As the volume of orders 
was low, the factory was ‘bleeding’; i.e. not able to make any profits. This placed considerable 
pressure on Silverstar’s owner to reduce the factory’s running costs. One way to reduce costs was 
by laying-off 500-700 workers. According to the local sourcing company, Matrix Sourcing, workers 
were being paid the full gratuity that Silverstar was required to offer under Pakistan’s labor laws. 
However, some of the our individual worker and focus group interviews indicated that laid-off 
workers were not paid their compensation in full; 
“Some people have been fired. Some have got their full payment, gratuity etc. Some are not paid in 
full.” (Interview with Silverstar Worker) 
 
The reduced amount of work also had other consequences for the implementation of Nike’s 
production and CSR model in Silverstar. Some of the fringe benefits associated with stitching 
footballs were not paid in full either. This was the case with the stitchers’ lunch money, for 
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example, where football stitchers were supposed to be paid PKR 21 daily that would allow them to 
buy their food at the Silverstar canteen.  
“Then we used to get 21 Rs for the meals but now they have reduced that amount to 10 Rs…. They 
say our factory is in crisis situation so you wouldn’t get the whole amount unless the factory’s 
situation gets better.” (Interview with Silverstar stitcher) 
 
The financial crisis also affected Nike’s production model in other ways. For example, workers who 
were stitching more than the required four balls a day were no longer receiving any bonus 
payments. One of the male Silverstar stitchers expressed how this happened; 
“Around 30-40% of the people are facing this problem. These are the people who stitch five balls 
daily and every month they get 500-1000 Rs less salary somehow. When we go to them regarding 
their calculation, they ask us how many days have you worked for? This much. So they just 
complicate it and confuse us. The issue is that many people are not educated here so we facing a lot 
of problems due to that. Whatever we are getting, we are thankful to Nike that apart from being the 
most renowned brand of the world, it asks for the quality work and also tries to give many facilities 
to workers. But unfortunately these facilities don’t reach us.” (Interview with Silverstar stitcher) 
 
In summarizing this section on vertical relations, we can state that Nike’s sourcing policy of 
reducing orders to Silverstar in mid-2009 had the effect of reducing workers’ wages, fringe benefits, 
and gratuity payments. In order words, it appeared as if Nike’s sourcing policy constrained the 
ability of Silverstar’s male workers to extract higher wages and fringe benefits from their employer. 
This raises the question of the extent to which Nike’ CSR policy might have facilitated the ability of 
Silverstar’s workers to engage in labor agency within this wider macro-economic context. We 
explore this question in the next section that investigates how Nike’s sourcing and CSR policies 
interacted with the local context of work and employment in Sialkot – the horizontal dimension – in 
creating particular labor agency outcomes.   
 
5   Constrained agency? Horizontal relations in Sialkot, Pakistan 
In this section, we use the horizontal element of our analytical framework to explore how private 
sector consultants, trade union activities, NGOs, and national media in Pakistan facilitated and/or 
constrained labor agency at the Silverstar factory. We start out by looking at the role played by the 
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private sector consultants hired by Nike to monitor the implementation of its production and CSR 
requirements. 
 
5.1   Private Sector Consultants 
Our analytical framework highlighted that private sector consultants might play a role in 
constraining labor agency in circumstances where they were paid to conduct rapid and superficial 
audits whose results remained unpublished. At the same time, this negative assessment saw such 
consultants as primarily being accountable to the multinational companies that hire them and not 
shop-floor workers. However, if private sector consultants were to employ more participatory, 
worker-centered methods to auditing, these might embody the potential for serving as a channel for 
raising workers’ concerns with their employers and end customers.  
 
At the time of our fieldwork in Sialkot in mid-2009, a local sourcing company, Matrix Sourcing, 
was functioning as Nike’s ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground in Pakistan (and Sialkot where Matrix had 
opened an office). However, the frequent presence of the Matrix production and CSR monitoring 
staff in the Silverstar factory did not appear to make any difference to the workers’ ability to voice 
their concerns. As one male stitcher stated, 
“ …we have this Matrix team … they assured us in the beginning that if you have any problem, 
related to work, or related to your payments, you should come to us and complain. We go to them 
but they are not that helpful either, they just listen to us nicely but give no results.” 
 
The Silverstar football stitchers also mentioned that other CSR compliance monitoring teams (i.e 
not Matrix Sourcing) would sometimes visit the factory. Usually, these consultants would spend 
time with the factory management of Silverstar before being taken on a tour of the factory 
accompanied by its management. They would rarely, if ever, directly attempt to speak to the 
workers. Hence, it appeared as if the visits of these monitors made little, if any, difference to the 
workers’ ability to communicate their concerns related to their work conditions. 
“Interviewer: What difference does it [the monitor’s visit] make to your work conditions? 
Silverstar Stitcher:  It does not make any difference to us. We work as a routine. They visit, they 
watch, and they leave.” 
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In a similar way, some of the Silverstar stitchers indicated that the visits of these monitors might be 
helpful if the monitors were to speak directly to the workers. However, in practice, this did not 
happen and monitors tended to speak only to the Silverstar management as the two quotes from 
different workers illustrate below: 
“They don’t really let us access them……No one has asked us whether we have any difficulties or 
trouble….. they just visit briefly. They could, for example, ask the factory management to let them 
speak to a couple of workers.” (Interview with Silverstar stitcher) 
 
“I have seen that whenever the foreigners come for inspection, there are so many people of haji 
sahib [i.e. the owner] designated all around the team that no one dares to talk to them. If these 
problems could be communicated to them, workers would be in better position. They will know then 
that the factory is taking all the facilities from us but not passing it on to the workers.” (Interview 
with Silverstar Stitcher) 
 
In other words, it appears as if the CSR monitoring and audits conducted by private sector 
consultants in the Silverstar factory did not facilitate the ability of Silverstar’s workers to exercise 
labor agency in Nike’s GPN. In fact, as described in the section on ‘vertical’ relations, some of the 
male Silverstar workers praised Nike’s for its progressive policies towards workers. However, as 
the workers had no direct line of communication with Nike, they could not formally voice their 
concerns to the US brand. 
 
5.2   Trade Unions 
Another factor that might facilitate labor agency in Nike’s GPN could be the existence of a local 
trade union in Silverstar that could help workers to organize collectively and negotiate their 
demands vis-à-vis the Silverstar management. However, our analytical framework also emphasized 
that levels of unionization amongst factory-based workers are often very low in developing 
countries, trade union officials may in reality represent their own or their employers’ interest, and 
are sometimes also corrupt, thus limiting the potential for labor agency in such factories.   
 
The management of Silverstar was against the idea of introducing a trade union in the factory. 
Instead the NGO PILER proposed to utilize the institution of ‘shop stewards’ and the mechanism of 
a Joint Works Council under the Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002 (operative in 2008) which was 
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accepted by the Silverstar management. Shop stewards were to act as link between labor and 
management and to coordinate their interaction but did not have the right to engage in collective 
bargaining under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The elections of shop stewards (two from each 
department) were held through secret balloting and the workers participated and elected about 25-
27 shop stewards.  These shop steward elections were organized by PILER and Just Solutions. Our 
worker interviews indicated that the elections were held in a transparent way. As one of the male 
Silverstar stitchers put it; 
Interviewer: What do you say about that [elections being held]? 
ML: I think positively about that. Elections must be held. In every firm or factory the labor workers 
must have a representative.....they [the elections] were fair. The representatives were elected on the 
basis of votes. There was no issue with the elections.” (Interview with Silverstar stitcher) 
 
However, similar to the role that private consultants played in the factory, our worker interviews 
indicated that the presence of the elected shop stewards made little or no difference in relation to 
workers voicing their concerns vis-à-vis management or Nike for that matter. As another stitcher 
explained; 
“Yes, there were elections and members were elected. But the members are poor and weak like us. 
When they are offered some money, they just become inactive and keep their mouths shut. 
Otherwise, we are well aware of how influential members can really be in an issue like this.” 
 
As the elected workers came from poor backgrounds, it appeared to be relatively easy for the 
management to dissuade them from taking any action. In fact, management pressure appeared to be 
an additional factor explaining why the shop stewards did not play any significant role in 
advocating workers’ rights vis-à-vis the Silverstar management. One of the Silverstar stitchers 
explained; 
“Because if these representatives speak in favour of the company, the owner of the factory is happy. 
And if these representatives talk in favour of the workers and labor, the owner of the factory is 
unhappy. What would they [the factory management] say? These people are not really good. These 
people create disturbance. This is what they do. They incite fellow workers. Right? They will say 
these things and as a result the factory owner will threaten these people.”  
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Hence, it would appear as if neither Nike hiring private sector consultants to monitor work 
conditions in Silverstar nor the election of shop stewards amongst Silverstar’s stitchers had a 
positive impact on what Wright (2000) calls the associational power of workers.  This raises the 
question of whether involving local NGOs in training workers in their rights under Pakistani labor 
law and Nike’s code of conduct might be more successful in facilitating labor agency amongst 
Silverstar’s stitchers. 
 
5.3   Non-Governmental Organizations 
As argued in our analytical framework, local NGOs may facilitate labor agency at local supplier 
factories by bringing knowledge, resource, and context sensitivity to the work of corporations 
whose operations impact on workers and local communities in developing countries. This could 
occur, for example, through opening a channel of communication between the workers and their 
end customer, the internationally branded company. However, NGOs may also be co-opted into the 
worldviews of corporate managers, losing their critical approach and independence in instances 
where they come to rely on financial contributions from multinational companies to undertake their 
work. In this case, Nike’s new CSR approach included a component that involved PILER providing 
training to Silverstar’s workers about their rights under Pakistani labor law and Nike’s code of 
conduct.  Some Silverstar stitchers were quite critical of the training provided by PILER, indicating 
that the PILER staff and the Silverstar management appeared to be too close for comfort. 
“The PILER people come here. We have meetings with them but they are just for the name sake. If 
we tell any problem in those meetings, 70% of the time, they take the owners side….Although they 
claim that we are here to tell you about your rights and how can you get those but on the other 
hand, if we raise our voice, they just speak the owner’s language and don’t listen to us.” 
 
However, while some workers indicated that they were skeptical of the PILER staff, most of our 
worker interviews indicated a very high level of awareness of the exact salary levels and fringe 
benefits that workers were supposed to obtain as part of their employment at the factory. Crucially, 
some workers indicated that they had achieved this awareness through PILER’s training. Now they 
were able to calculate their exact wage and identify whether they had been paid the right amount or 
not. One of the workers explained how this worked in practice; 
“You see this is my salary slip. The detail that appears here, you see. I stitched 87 footballs in 
about 20.5 working days. This is because they gave us leave during Fridays, Saturdays and 
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Sundays due to shortage of work. We were scheduled to work for 18 days. So having worked for 18 
days and completing the week 23 working days out of which I took leave for two days. This way I 
worked for 20.5 days, as one day I did not feel well and so I came home after 12 {and worked for 
half a day}. They show here that they have paid me for that day. They show there that I have 
received Rs. 6760. [However,] this was not the amount I was paid.” 
 
While none of the Matrix Sourcing team, the shop stewards and PILER appeared to be directly 
helpful in channeling the workers’ demands vis-à-vis the Silverstar management, this increased 
level of awareness of their rights and responsibilities appeared to facilitate joint action amongst the 
workers. With all other communication channels blocked in the workers’ perception, they began to 
organize spontaneous strikes when their wages and fringe benefits were either not paid in full or not 
paid on time. The leaders of these strikes turned out to be some of the more well-educated workers 
that were willing to stand up to the Silverstar management and were less afraid of losing their jobs.  
 
In practice, these strikes would involve several workers. For example, in one instance, one of the 
workers explained how 70-80 workers had filed separate complaints about the manager that was in 
charge of salary calculations, some of them demanding that he be removed from this position. In 
another instance, some of the workers explained how they jointly engaged a strike when they 
discovered that their salaries had not been calculated correctly. 
“They had told us that they would pay us, as you know that they used to pay us Rs. 20 for roti 
(bread for lunch), but then they reduced it to Rs. 10 and at the same time they had told us that they 
would pay us Rs. 5 as extra bonus with each football.  
 
When the month ended on the 7
th
 [July 2009], they did not pay anyone Rs. 5 bonus. So, the annual 
bonus of Rs. 500 was not paid. That means that they deducted the money from our wages but never 
paid it back. And the stitchers had expected it. Even though the stitchers are illiterate but they can 
calculate that they have stitched such and such number of footballs and so they must be paid the 
fitting amount.  
 
When they calculated with the number of footballs they had stitched they realized that they were not 
paid in full. So, they all gathered together and thus this strike continued till the 12
th
. They were told 
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that they would be paid from the 12
th
 day of the month. And the stitchers warned them that only if 
their wages would be from the 12
th
 of the month, they would continue their work.”  
 
Several of the interviews we conducted with the Silverstar stitchers indicated that these strikes were 
an effective way of having their demands met. As one of the workers stated,  
“...they only accept our demands when they are left with no choice. Had one or two persons 
approached then, you see the usual pattern is that if a couple of us approach them about something, 
as he [the owner] tells us that we should be at the most two people approaching him and discuss the 
matter with him…. But if around 1000 workers gather together about a matter then he realizes how 
serious the matter is.”  
 
Hence, compared to the time when Nike’s footballs were stitched in the decentralized stitching 
centres of Saga Sports in the villages around Sialkot, making it very difficult to organize workers, it 
appeared as if strikes were now a frequent phenomenon at the Silverstar factory.  In other words, it 
seems that the centralization of football stitching and the training of workers in their rights and 
duties played a vital role in facilitating labor agency at the Silverstar factory.  
 
5.4   National Media 
The final part of our analytical framework pointed to the potential of national media in facilitating 
labor agency at the suppliers of internationally branded companies in developing countries. By 
highlighting the plight of workers in the public sphere, national media may pressurize local 
factories to respond positively to workers’ demands. However, if freedom of press is lacking, and 
journalists persecuted by national authorities, this might act as constraint on labor agency at the 
suppliers of internationally branded companies. The national media in Pakistan has traditionally 
been controlled been the ruling government whether this was a civilian or a military government. 
However, President Musharraf, the former military ruler, decided to liberalize the media laws of 
Pakistan in 2004. This led to a mushrooming of private television channels out of which the GEO 
news channel is perhaps the most prominent. One of the workers explained how GEO had played an 
important role for the workers in terms of having their demands met during one of the strikes. 
“There were about 250 to 300 employees protesting. Then someone phoned people from Geo (the 
media channel) as well. Actually the problem was not being resolved. Everyone was getting like 
Rs.1,000, Rs.1,500 or Rs.1,800 as salary but they issued only Rs.200, Rs.250 or at maximum around 
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Rs.500 or Rs.700 to the same people.  They kept everyone like that. Although, some people were 
given salary after 5:00pm but if was too late. So, the workers went on strike the very next day. [the 
Geo people ] phoned the owner of the factory and told him that they got a call from a worker and 
that they are coming to cover the news. The owner told them that the issue was resolved and there 
was no need for them to come now.” (Interview with Silverstar Stitcher) 
 
Our interviews indicated that the issue was indeed solved. As another worker put it: 
“Now you see recently there was a strike, the GEO {TV channel} representatives reached the 
factory gate. But they were held outside the gate and were not allowed inside. Meanwhile the strike 
had come to an end. By 12 o clock they had accepted our demands and the strike had come to an 
end.” (Interview with Silverstar Stitcher) 
 
In other words, when workers were aware of their rights under national labor laws and a 
multinational company’s code of conduct, and when they were able to gather together in a central 
production site, a free national media may enforce the structural power of workers, or more 
specifically the workplace organizing power to stop production, as publicizing worker unrest 
through the national media may cause embarrassment for local factories and challenges in relation 
to their international buyers. This may have implications for the ways in which international brands, 
NGOs, and trade unions seek to empower workers in GPNs. This is an issue that we touch upon in 
the conclusion below. 
 
6   Conclusion: CSR alone is not enough 
In this article, we set out to investigate the circumstances in which the CSR policies of 
internationally branded companies facilitated or undermined workers’ agency in export-oriented 
industries in developing countries. Using the case of Nike’s production and CSR model in the 
Pakistani football manufacturing industry, our analysis has demonstrated that most of the 
company’s production and CSR requirements tended to have a limited impact on facilitating worker 
agency. In theory, Nike had attempted to coordinate its production and CSR policies by paying a 
premium price for the footballs it sourced, which would – at least partly – cover its suppliers’ added 
costs of abiding with Nike’s code of conduct. However, as Nike was not able to place the envisaged 
orders, its supplier factory, Silverstar, had to reduce its costs in order to stay afloat. This meant that 
many of the salary payments including added bonus incentives were not paid in full to the factory’s 
23 
 
football stitchers in 2009. This severely restrained the scope that workers had for reworking the 
system in ways that allowed them to extract extra benefits from their participation in Nike’s GPN.  
 
At the same time, Nike’s use of private sector consultants, the election of shop stewards, and 
training of workers in their rights under Pakistani labor law and Nike’s code of conduct had 
differential outcomes. Nike’s use of private sector consultants appeared to block any possibilities of 
the workers directly communicating their concerns to Nike.  The election of shop stewards had little 
effect on the ability of workers to collectively organise themselves and defend their rights vis-à-vis 
management. Most of these representatives were elected on the basis of friendship/kinship with 
workers from particular areas/villages in and around Sialkot. They tended to be quite weak and 
poor, and without the clout to challenge the management on non-compliance with Nike’s code of 
conduct. However, the training of workers in their rights under Pakistani labor law and Nike’s code 
of conduct appeared to raise the awareness of workers in such a way that they spontaneously began 
to organize strikes when their wages were not paid in full. And the publicizing of such strikes in 
local media had the potential to help facilitate labor agency in GPNs. 
 
With respect to our theoretical framework, we have highlighted the structural limitations that 
internationally branded companies face in relation to facilitating labor agency in export-oriented 
industries. As they are not directly responsible for managing the most intensive labor aspects of 
production, they not only outsource the financial risks associated with production to their suppliers 
but also the labor management function which means that workers – instead of turning to Nike for 
proper payments of their wages – are left to bargain with a supplier firm that receives a relatively 
small share of the valued added in the GPN for football manufacturing. However, to the extent that 
internationally branded companies may facilitate labor agency vis-à-vis their own suppliers, it 
appears that training workers’ in their rights is an efficient way of incentivizing them to collectively 
organize and extract benefits from supplier firms in the GPNs of internationally branded companies. 
As such, the various kinds of place-based actors that constitute the horizontal dimension of GPNs 
become critical to facilitating worker agency.  
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